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perb book makes a valuable contribution not only for what it contains but
also for stimulating reﬂection about issues like these.
Democracy and the Left: Social Policy and Inequality in Latin America.
By Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2012. Pp. xx1342. $27.50.
Lane Kenworthy
University of Arizona
Democracy and the Left is one of the ﬁrst systematic examinations of in-
come inequality in a middle- or low-income region. It’s an excellent book—
required reading for students of inequality, democracy, and Latin Amer-
ica.
Evelyne Huber and John Stephens ask what determines variation in in-
come inequality across countries and over time in Latin America. They also
examine poverty, but I’ll focus here, as they do, on inequality. They conduct
quantitative analyses using data for all 18 Latin American nations from
1971 to 2005, in-depth historical within-case analyses of ﬁve countries, and
a comparison of two most-similar cases from outside the region ðPortugal
and SpainÞ with four Latin American cases. Their analyses are thorough
and careful, and they are appropriately cautious in their inferences.
Huber and Stephens conclude that in Latin America democracy has
been the most inﬂuential contributor to low income inequality. It helps in
two ways. First, democracy makes it more likely that left parties will hold
the government. Left parties reduce income inequality by expanding access
to education, rejecting inegalitarian policy orientations encouraged by in-
ternational economic agencies such as the International Monetary Fund,
and steering government transfers in a propoor direction. Second, democ-
racy fosters competition for votes between parties of the Left and Right, so
even the Right behaves in a somewhat egalitarian fashion when in power.
The hypothesis is compelling. Authoritarian governments can reduce in-
equality if they wish, and there are plenty of historical instances. But they
are more likely to favor concentrating income in the hands their support-
ers. On theoretical grounds, democracy should be much more conducive to
low income inequality.
Key pieces of evidence are supportive. There are three Latin American
countries that democratized relatively early and ðfor the most partÞ re-
mained democratic: Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. In the 1980s, the ear-
liest point for which reliable comparative data exist, the level of income
inequality in this group was substantially below the Latin American aver-
age.
Another six Latin American nations turned democratic in the 1980s.
Drawing on earlier research by Edward Muller ð“Democracy, Economic
Development, and Income Inequality,” American Sociological Review 53
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½1988: 50–68Þ, Huber and Stephens hypothesize that democracy’s egalitar-
ian effect will show up about 20 years later. And sure enough, in the 2000s
income inequality did begin to decrease in a number of these countries,
after having risen or held constant in prior decades. This fall in inequality
is particularly striking given that globalization, technological change, and
other developments were causing inequality to rise in some other parts of
the world at this time.
The verdict that democracy has been key is not, however, a slam dunk.
First, other developments could conceivably account for the reduction in
income inequality in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s. There was a widespread
discrediting of “Washington consensus” policies favoring limited govern-
ment and inﬂation avoidance over full employment and redistribution.
Also, a commodity boom helped generate rapid economic growth, enabling
increased government spending on education and other social programs.
Second, this period of falling income inequality is brief. Was it the be-
ginning of a sustained decline, or merely a temporary blip? It’s still too
soon to tell.
Third, in the world’s rich nations, the shift in income inequality in recent
decades has consisted mainly of growing separation between the top 1% of
households and the rest. The available inequality data for Latin American
countries are likely to capture developments within the bottom 99% but
miss changes in the gap between those 99% and the top 1%. Until better
data are available on incomes at the top, we can’t be certain we have an
accurate picture of the cross-country and over-time variation in inequality.
But none of this is Huber and Stephens’s fault. They have done exactly
what scientists should do: get the best available data, analyze it as carefully
as possible, and clearly convey what you ﬁnd.
How will things play out in Latin America going forward? Here it’s
worth emphasizing two respects in which Huber and Stephens ﬁnd that
patterns in Latin America differ from those in the world’s already-rich
nations. First, they ﬁnd no evidence of a signiﬁcant inequality-reducing
contribution from organized labor. In the absence of a strong push from
unions, will left parties continue to prioritize inequality reduction? And if
they do, can they continue to succeed in achieving it?
Second, Huber and Stephens ﬁnd that left parties’ inequality-reducing
impact comes not via more government social expenditure. Public social
programs in Latin America are heavily weighted toward old-age pensions,
and the pension programs tend to be structured so as to reinforce rather
than counteract the unequal distribution of earnings in the labor market.
Instead, left parties have reduced income inequality by expanding edu-
cation, which has decreased inequality of earnings, and by increasing the
progressivity ðrather than amountÞ of government transfers. This pattern
is quite different from what we see across the rich countries, where edu-
cation is not a helpful predictor of income inequality and where the quan-
tity of government transfers matters more than their progressivity. Will
the same be true for Latin American nations as they get richer? Or will
they follow a different path?
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Answers to these questions await more data and additional analysis.
Huber and Stephens’s book is a terriﬁc launching pad.
Local Protest, Global Movements: Capital, Community, and State in San
Francisco. By Karl Beitel. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2013.
Pp. x1219. $29.95 ðpaperÞ.
John Arena
City University of New York
What are the prospects in the United States of building a broad, anticap-
italist left movement capable of challenging the power of capital? How
could various urban social movements cohere into a “genuinely counter-
hegemonic left-progressive urban alliance” that would be a core compo-
nent of this new working class–based “antisystemic” movement ðp. 150Þ?
These are the politically relevant questions that drive activist and author
Karl Beitel’s study of urban social movements in San Francisco over the
last half-century, Local Protest, Global Movements.
In contrast to postmaterialist, new social movement theorizing, the au-
thor conceptualizes the variety of land use and tenant activism struggles
analyzed in the book as rooted in what James O’Connor has termed “the
second contradiction” of capitalism ð“The Second Contradiction of Capi-
talism,” Capitalism Nature Socialism 5 ½1994: 105–14Þ. As opposed to the
ﬁrst contradiction located at the workplace, the second contradiction of
capitalism addresses what Karl Marx termed “the conditions of produc-
tion” that are required for capital accumulation but that are not produced
as commodities, such as urban space and labor power. The urban social
movements dealing with land use and tenant activism, which are the focus
of the book, are what he terms a particular “species” of the larger “genus” of
movements arising from the second contradiction ðp. 52Þ. In a critique of
O’Connor, he argues that struggles around the production of urban space
must be grasped not from the side of capital, but “from the vantage point
of the historically and socially conditioned individual . . . and the meaning
and sentiments embedded within an individual’s sense of community and
neighborhood” ðp. 52Þ.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of community struggles in San Fran-
cisco from the 1950s through the 1980s, including efforts to block federal
highway projects, stop eviction of low-income tenants from the Interna-
tional Hotel, and stage ballot initiatives to win rent control. In contrast to
other critical urbanists, Beitel argues that Nixon’s “new federalism” in the
early 1970s, and other neoliberal trends that devolved responsibilities to
cities, strengthened the power of local activists to intervene in develop-
ment battles. Through militant community mobilizations, nonproﬁt ðalso
referred to as NGOsÞ housing groups were able to gain control of federal
community development block grants to use for constructing affordable
housing. Also, community groups mobilized to pass a number of rent- and
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